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Why it is on the listOne of the largest thefts of personal data from a single company, and the standard example of what an unapplied update can cost.
In plain English
Equifax holds credit histories, so it holds names, birth dates and social security numbers for most American adults. A web tool that let people dispute their credit file used a software component called Apache Struts.
In March 2017 a serious flaw in Struts was made public, with a fix. The US government alerted Equifax the next day. The flaw stayed open on that tool for months, and attackers walked in.
A second failure kept it hidden. The tool that inspects network traffic had an expired security certificate, so it was effectively blind for about 19 months.
Words used here
- Apache Struts
- A popular building block for web applications. A flaw in it let outsiders run commands on the server.
- Security certificate
- A digital ID that security tools need to inspect encrypted traffic. When it expires, some tools stop working without saying so.
What happened
A US House of Representatives committee reported in December 2018 that the breach was entirely preventable. The company used a flawed version of Struts on a customer-complaint website and never updated it. Also, a security tool that should have spotted the attack had been switched off for 19 months by an expired certificate.
When the certificate was renewed on July 29, 2017, the company immediately saw suspicious traffic. The breach was announced in September 2017 and covered about 147 million people, by the committee's account. Counts in secondary reports vary between 143 and 148 million.
How it unfolded
- March 2017
A critical Struts flaw is published with a fix. Equifax is alerted.
- May to July 2017
Attackers access the system and extract data.
- July 29, 2017
Certificate renewed; unusual traffic is spotted.
- September 2017
Company announces the breach.
- December 2018
House Oversight Committee publishes its report.
Who was affected
About 147 million people, mainly in the US, with smaller numbers in the UK and Canada.
What the response was
- Equifax shut off the vulnerable tool and engaged outside investigators.
- It offered free credit monitoring and later settled with US regulators.
What went wrong
- A known critical update was not applied for months.
- Responsibility for patching was not clear.
- A silent tool failure (the expired certificate) hid the attack.
What worked
- Once the certificate was fixed, the intrusion was spotted quickly.
What organisations should do differently
- Track every important software component and who is responsible for updating it.
- Set a deadline for critical fixes (days, not months) and check it is met.
- Monitor your monitors: alert when a security tool stops reporting.
What you can do today
- Make a list of the public-facing software you run and when it was last updated.
- Put certificate expiry dates in a calendar or alerting tool.
- If your own data was exposed, freeze your credit reports; it is free in many countries.
The lesson that still holds
Updates are a job with an owner and a deadline, not a hope. And any tool that watches for trouble needs something watching it.
Sources
- The Equifax Data Breach (US House Committee on Oversight, majority staff report)US House Oversight Committee, Dec 2018
- Equifax breach report highlights multiple security failuresTechTarget
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