Details may change as reporting changes. Information comes from the linked sources, and we do not guarantee it is complete or current.
Why it is on the listIt was the first ransomware outbreak to spread worldwide in hours, and it hit hospitals directly.
In plain English
Normal ransomware needs someone to click something. WannaCry did not. It found other unpatched Windows computers on the same network and on the internet and copied itself onto them, locking each one and demanding payment.
Microsoft had already released a fix for the flaw it used two months earlier. The machines that were hit were the ones that had not applied it, many of them old systems that could not easily be updated.
A researcher then found a switch in the code. Registering a certain web address made the spread stop for new infections, which slowed it a great deal. Computers already locked stayed locked.
Words used here
- Worm
- Malware that spreads on its own from computer to computer without anyone clicking.
- Ransomware
- Malware that locks your files and demands payment to unlock them.
- Patch
- A software update that fixes a known flaw.
What happened
CISA's alert from May 12, 2017 described reports of tens of thousands of infections in over 150 countries.
The UK's National Audit Office found at least 81 of 236 NHS trusts in England were affected, plus 603 other NHS organisations including 595 GP practices. It said thousands of appointments and operations were cancelled, NHS England estimated over 19,000 in total, and in five areas patients had to travel further for emergency care. It also said it believed no patient data was stolen.
In 2018 the US Justice Department charged a North Korean programmer with creating the malware used. That is an allegation.
How it unfolded
- March 2017
Microsoft releases a fix for the flaw.
- May 12, 2017
WannaCry begins spreading worldwide. NHS organisations start reporting outages.
- May 12 to 13
A researcher registers a domain that acts as a kill switch for new infections.
- October 2017
The National Audit Office publishes its investigation.
Who was affected
Organisations in over 150 countries. In the UK, a large part of the NHS.
What the response was
- NHS organisations took systems offline, switched to paper, and diverted some patients.
- Microsoft released emergency fixes even for versions it no longer supported.
What went wrong
- Known fixes had not been installed across many systems.
- Old operating systems were still in use for important work.
- Different parts of the organisation did not have a rehearsed response.
What worked
- Staff had paper-based fallbacks and used them.
- Fast public information and a kill switch slowed the spread.
What organisations should do differently
- Install security updates quickly, starting with systems exposed to the internet.
- Replace systems that no longer get updates, or isolate them.
- Practise working on paper.
What you can do today
- Turn on automatic updates on every computer and phone you own.
- Keep a backup that is not connected to the computer, and test restoring it.
The lesson that still holds
The fix usually exists before the attack. The difference between a quiet week and a bad one is how fast you apply it.
Sources
- Indicators associated with WannaCry ransomwareCISA, May 12, 2017
- Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHSUK National Audit Office, Oct 2017
- North Korean regime-backed programmer charged (US Department of Justice)US Department of Justice, Sep 6, 2018
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